编者按：“为什么马科斯政府一再否认曾同中方商谈达成仁爱礁管控谅解和安排？为什么菲国防部拒绝与中方通过对话协商妥处涉海分歧？如果说‘君子协定’系菲上届政府与中方达成的，那么‘新模式’系菲现政府与中方达成的，而且已被实践证明是可以管控分歧、避免冲突的，为什么却仅在发挥一次作用后就被菲方再次无故抛弃？到底是谁作出了背弃‘新模式’的决定？难道管控分歧、避免冲突违背了某些势力的利益？”

近日，在面对记者提问菲律宾多位高官否认曾与中方达成“君子协定”时，我驻菲律宾大使馆发言人五连问，再次阐明了中国在此问题上的态度。

中国和菲律宾在南海问题上的争议如何解决？西方媒体口中解放军的“危险演习”，为什么让菲律宾和美国如此紧张？中国加快军队建设的目标是什么？

4月29日，《South China Morning Post》（香港南华早报）刊登了对国防部国际军事合作办公室前安全中心主任、清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波进行的长篇专访。周波就中国军力发展、中美关系、俄乌冲突、加沙冲突及现代战争、核武器运用与人工智能等回答了记者提出的问题。

北京对话受权翻译并由观网发布，中英文如下：

【文/周波，翻译/晶婉 赵欣，核译/韩桦】

南华早报：中国和菲律宾在南海争议岛屿问题上争执已久。您认为这种情况会持续下去吗？中国的策略是什么？

周波：中国从未对菲律宾使用过武力。中国海警是用过水炮驱逐菲律宾海警，但这是威慑，而不是使用武力。从历史上看，使用武力的是菲律宾海警，他们在2000年、2006年和2013年，杀害过来自中国大陆和台湾的无辜中国渔民。似乎很少有人记得这一点，但互联网上能搜到。

1999年5月，菲律宾以“技术困难”为借口，在仁爱礁搁浅了一艘军舰。面对中方的抗议，他们承诺会拖走该舰。但是他们并没有这样做。相反，菲律宾试图将其建成一个永久性的设施。

菲律宾声称，中国威胁要使用武力驱逐长期以来一直在黄岩岛水域捕鱼的菲律宾渔民。但首先诉诸武力的是菲律宾。2012年4月，他们派出一艘军舰前往黄岩岛水域，扣留并逮捕了中国渔船和渔民。

中国不得不采取必要措施回应这种挑衅行为。然而，我们的回应是克制的。出于人道主义原因，我们没有阻止菲律宾为其在坐滩军舰上的士兵提供水和食物。否则，他们怎么可能在25年里一直待在那里？

南华早报：在这种情况下，对中国来说最好和最坏的情况是什么，中国政府是否在做最坏的打算？东盟是否有形成类似“北约”联盟的风险？

周波：最好的情况是菲律宾像他们承诺的那样，拖走那艘（坐滩）军舰。至少他们不应该试图加固那艘军舰。最好的办法是让大自然用她的不可抗力来解决问题。

最坏情况是，如果他们继续如此挑衅，局势肯定更加紧张。因为是菲律宾自食其言，违反其在1999年做出的承诺。中国的要求完全合理，我们在过去几十年中表现出了极大的耐心。

东盟是否会像北约那样结盟？我认为不可能。东盟本质上就不是一个军事联盟。东盟宣布要保持中立，而中立必须依赖公正。尽管菲律宾是东盟成员国，中国与菲律宾的争议，并不意味着中国与东盟存在问题。

菲律宾“坐滩”的“马德雷山号”

南海问题不能被解读为中国与东盟有争端，中国只与少数东盟声索国存在争议。实际上，许多东盟国家之间也存在争议水域，也有相互重叠的主权声索。

南华早报：您如何看待美国在中国南海紧张局势中的作用？

周波：我不认为美国会跳到前台，替任何东盟声索国对抗中国。美国人不会这么愚蠢，他们在欧洲和中东已经麻烦够多了。

中国从未威胁要对东盟国家使用武力。中国一直遵守2002年《南海各方行为宣言》，该宣言不鼓励在该地区使用武力。

我希望菲律宾不会愚蠢到火中取栗。中菲实力悬殊，菲方应该清楚地知道他们没有任何机会。即使现状会持续一段时间，最终偃旗息鼓的一定是菲律宾政府。

南华早报：西方评论员将中国人民解放军在南海的活动描述为“危险的演习”或“鲁莽的行动”。您认为这一主导叙事或理解在现代地缘政治中扮演了什么角色？

周波：我认为将解放军描绘成“胁迫”或鲁莽是一种故意的西方叙事。但到目前为止，西方媒体未能以更负面的方式描述解放军，因为他们根本找不到实例。

中国的和平发展是个奇迹。自1979年以来，尽管发生了2001年中美撞机、2020年中印士兵冲突等事件，但中国没有与任何其他国家发生过任何战争。

2001年坠毁的解放军海军航空兵81192号歼-8战斗机

在过去四十多年里，我们没有打过一场战争，却跃升为世界第二大经济体，这是非常了不起的。这不仅仅是运气，我们为了我们的目标和更美好的愿景忍耐并克制。我坚信中国的崛起是和平的，在人类历史上是罕见的。

南华早报；西方对中国的讨论不可避免地伴随着对解放军所谓的“挑衅行为”的批评，以及对中国军力增长的担忧。您如何看待外界对解放军的看法？

周波：中国人民解放军当然会给不同的人带来许多不同的反应——敬畏、恐惧或不确定。解放军海军现在是世界上规模最大的海军。所以，人们很自然地会问，一支日益强大的解放军对中国和世界意味着什么。有些人认为解放军自1979年以来没有打过战争，怀疑解放军是否能打仗。

对于世界上的所有军队来说，有一个任务是共同的，即保卫领土和主权完整。但作为世界大国，中国军队还有两项职责：维护中国的海外利益，承担中国的国际责任。

例如，自2009年以来，解放军在亚丁湾护航，为中国和外国船只提供了同等保护。这是一个很好的例子，说明强大的解放军如何将中国的国家利益与其国际责任完美地结合在一起。

中国海军第43批护航编队

南华早报：2027年是中国人民解放军建军100周年，中国设定了一个目标，希望将解放军队建成一支现代化的作战力量。这个目标具体意味着什么？解放军希望成为什么样的力量？

周波：解放军的最终目标不是秘密。我们已经宣布将在2049年把人民军队建设成为世界一流军队，这个目标在2022年中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上进行了修改，提出我们应该“加快”推进这个目标。这意味着我们必须在2049年之前成为世界一流军队，虽然没有提到我们应该提前多少年实现这一目标。

2027年的目标则不同，因为这是解放军建军100周年，具有里程碑意义。我们要加强军队建设，为提前实现2049年目标做准备。

与此同时，我们面临的最大困境是，如何在不用打仗的情况下，还能证明我们是世界一流军队。中国一直致力于和平发展，也从和平发展中受益。通过砍别人的头来测试自己的剑刃是否锋利的做法是错误的。

虽然我们40多年没有打过仗，但这并不意味着我们不能打，否则美军就不会如此担心解放军。

南华早报：中国为什么要加快军队建设？

周波：我认为这与如何看待整体局势有很大关系，比如中美关系、台海和南海潜在冲突等。台湾应该是其中最重要的因素。

在台湾问题上，你可以看到北京对台湾地区前领导人马英九和现领导人蔡英文的态度有所不同。蔡的继任者赖清德可能会带来更多不确定性。

美国正加剧与中国的竞争，尽管它声称奉行“一个中国”政策，但仍然向台湾提供支持。这些都是我们加快军队建设，实现预期目标的充分理由。

南华早报：一些美方官员说，中国加强军力建设，是为了在2027年之前拿下台湾。您认为解放军的时间表与北京统一台湾的目标有关吗？

周波：如果你仔细研究中国所说的，中国仍然在谈和平统一。我们在2022年共产党第二十次全国代表大会上提到，我们将以最大的耐心，尽最大的努力实现和平统一。我认为这点现在没有改变。

南华早报：您认为台湾地区新当选领导人赖清德会不会跨越北京的“红线”？北京已经给他贴上了麻烦制造者和“顽固台独分子”的标签。

周波：实话说，我不知道。说他是“顽固的台独分子”，我认为确有一定道理，因为他曾宣称自己是“台独务实工作者”。问题是，当一个人有了新职位时，情况可能会发生变化。因此，我们只能拭目以待，看他如何行事。我相信美国也在密切观察。

南华早报：2022年8月，时任美国众议院议长佩洛西窜访台湾后，中国人民解放军进行了多轮演习，形成了经常飞越台湾海峡中线的新常态。您对此怎么看，这有多危险？

周波：之前我们没有飞越过中间线，起码不是经常飞越。佩洛西事件改变了这一态势。她窜访台湾对我们来说是完全不能接受的，这样的挑衅导致了现状。

如果不是她窜访台湾，我们就不会在台岛周围进行为期四天的实弹演习。这样的挑衅必然引起反应，反过来就会造成不可逆转的新现状。你可以看到现在我们越过中线的次数更多了——这是对他们挑衅行为的回应。这也是一种新的现状。

佩洛西窜访台湾后，中方公布的演习范围地图

南华早报：许多美国官员和智库认为，对台湾最可能的军事选择是封锁，但他们认为封锁很可能失败。您怎么看？

周波：军事规划者很少依赖一种选择。我认为我们有不同的选择。我们的选择取决于实际发生的情况。

南华早报：您对俄乌冲突怎么看？

周波：没有冲突会永远持续下去，问题是如何结束以及何时结束。我不认为乌克兰能重新夺回失去的领土。如果俄罗斯没有推进到已经占领的地区之外，乌克兰就算是幸运的了，因为自从去年以来，得到西方全力支持的乌克兰反攻已经失败。

军事平衡不利于乌克兰，整个西方也无法不间断地提供足够的弹药。我不认为乌克兰会占上风，尤其是如果特朗普重返白宫的话。他可能会对美国在乌克兰问题上的立场做出重大调整，这是欧洲国家最担心的事情。由于俄乌双方现在都不愿意停火，我们真不知道战争何时结束。

南华早报：您对中国在俄乌冲突中的立场有何看法？

周波：这场战争对中国影响重大，甚至折射出中国不断上升的国际地位；因为突然之间，大家都在问，中国站在哪一边，中国是怎么想的。

这场战争与中国毫无关系，人们都在问中国的立场就耐人寻味了。为什么会问起中国的立场？因为中国的立场太重要了，不容忽视。

西方认为中国可以简单地命令俄罗斯结束冲突，事情怎么可能会这么简单？看到一场与中国毫无关系的冲突实际上已经影响了中国与欧盟的关系，真是令人悲哀。

乌东前线的乌军

但我并不悲观。我认为，只要俄乌冲突还在继续，中欧关系就不会太好，因为欧盟对中国有奢望，中国无法满足；但只要台海没有战争，中欧关系也不至于太糟，因为他们不必在美国和他们最大的贸易伙伴之间做出艰难的抉择。

南华早报：您对加沙战争有什么看法？

周波：没有人知道俄乌冲突何时结束。而在中东，即使一场战争结束了，却没有人知道它何时会再次爆发。

加沙战争造成了大量人员伤亡，被描述为种族灭绝。美国对以色列的支持严重损害了其道德权威，极大地伤害了美国的形象和信誉，特别是在全球南方国家当中。其影响是长远的。

南华早报：您如何看待俄罗斯的韧性？战争造成了巨大的损失，它还能坚持下去吗？

周波：俄罗斯的经济表现其实相当不错，去年经济增长了3.6% 。这令所有人都感到惊讶，可能连俄罗斯人自己也感到吃惊，而乌克兰的经济状况却很糟糕。

从经验教训来看，俄罗斯显然在战场上取得了进展。但是一开始，他们似乎并没有准备好——没有前线指挥，没有足够的后勤补给，没有无人机，没有加密通讯，没有精确制导炸弹，但现在情况变了。

另一个教训是，战争模式已经发生了很大变化。中国人民解放军必须跟上先进技术的步伐，包括无人机，也许有一天还要用上人工智能技术，同时要保留坦克和大炮等传统装备。

过去，我们可能认为无人机是一种补充手段，但现在事实证明，它是一种新的作战手段，可以给战场带来巨大的变化。乌克兰和红海的冲突都证明了这一点。

俄罗斯军队装备的“海鹰”无人侦察机

与此同时，我们不能完全依赖新技术，在乌克兰战场，坦克和大炮仍在使用，士兵仍在挖战壕，就像第一次世界大战期间那样。

南华早报：说到先进技术，中国如何在军事上应用人工智能? 中国能否在这方面与美国合作？

周波：关于第一个问题，我们有各种最先进的无人机。我们还没有看到人工智能在军事战争中的直接应用，我认为即使美国也还没有证明这一点。

习近平主席和拜登总统去年在旧金山达成共识，将启动中美两国政府关于人工智能的对话，但新闻公告没有具体说明对话是否将涉及两军。

我认为，从长远来看，这并非完全不可能，因为两国都明白确保人类控制武器系统的重要性。先进的人工智能使这个问题变得更加尖锐。

南华早报：为了防止人工智能在比如核武器上的某些危险应用，美国和中国是否可以优先考虑一些领域？

周波：我认为，中国和美国近期还很难讨论这个问题，因为这些都是高度敏感的领域。到目前为止，中美两国在核领域没有进行任何正式磋商或谈判。要做到这一点，要么中国需要大幅增加其核武库，或者美国大幅削减其核武库。两者都不现实。

但我想，中国和美国都需要努力确保这种先进的人工智能不会应用于最关键的军事领域，包括核武器。没有什么比确保人类控制核指挥和控制系统更重要了。

南华早报：去年中美两国恢复了军事对话，现在又在进行对话，我们应该期待什么？

周波：恢复对话是必然的。新的情况是，现在战区司令之间有了沟通渠道。

这是一个需要双方深入探讨的新机制。例如，对话仅仅是解放军南部战区司令和美国印太司令之间的对话，还是也包括解放军北部战区司令和东部战区司令？

1月在美举行的第17届中美防务政策协调会谈

因为美国在中国沿海的侦察和监视覆盖了这三个中国战区。指挥官们是定期通话，还是仅仅在发生危机时通话？我猜他们主要是交流舰机之间危险相遇的问题。但涉及第三方的危险情况呢？诸如此类的问题可以一直问下去。

南华早报：中美舰机遭遇的风险有多大？

周波：中美军机已经发生了多起危险的近距离遭遇。根据五角大楼的说法，自2021年秋季之后的两年里，中国人民解放军拦截了180多架次美国军机。我们必须进行拦截，因为美国是到我们家门口来挑衅。

我认为解决这个问题并不容易，因为美国很难退缩。他们这样做由来已久，如果停止，他们会担心自己在盟友眼中的形象受损。但我不明白为什么美国要如此高强度地派舰机侦察监视中国。他们不是有很多无人机和军事卫星可以提供实时情报吗？

南华早报：中美军事冲突的风险被高估了吗？风险有多高，有没有解决的办法？

周波：当飞机和舰艇如此接近时，当然是非常危险的。中国和美国对“安全”有不同的理解，在中文中“safety”和“security”都翻译为安全。美国人谈论的是“safety”，而我们谈论的是“security”。

“Safety”意味着保护你的财产，比如你的舰艇和你的个人安全。但是“security”有更多的含义，它关乎主权，权利和利益。国际海洋法并不一定有帮助。

2013年，我率领一个中国代表团访问五角大楼，讨论航行自由的法律含义。双方对国际海洋法有不同的解释。因此,要降低遭遇风险，没有简单的解决方案。

南华早报：中国需要多少航空母舰? 为什么拥有这些航空母舰对中国如此重要？

周波：我不会推测中国需要多少航母，但我可以告诉你，航母主要不是用来进行近海作战的，它们的存在主要是为远海作战。

中国第二艘航母山东号

人们可能会说，有朝一日，当中国被迫放弃和平方式解决台湾问题时，我们可以使用航母。航母当然有用，但航母更多是用于我们向太平洋、印度洋或大西洋——任何远离我们水域的地方——进行力量投射。

南华早报：美国曾表示，到2030年，中国将拥有1000枚核弹头。您认为中国领导人在提高核能力背后的一些考量是什么？

周波：在中国，没有人会告诉你我们有多少核弹头。话虽如此，我们希望拥有一个高效、现代化的核武库，这并不是什么秘密。

既然各方都担心俄乌冲突中会使用核武器，那我们为什么不讨论一下不首先使用核武器的问题呢？拜登政府已经表示,只有在极端情况下才会使用核武器，这意味着它实际上与中国的“不首先使用核武器”政策相去不远。

中国“不首先使用”政策几十年来一直没有改变。我认为我们应该讨论中国和美国、法国、英国之间不首先使用核武器的问题。中国和俄罗斯已经同意不首先使用。作为一种善意的姿态，为了缓解西方最担心的俄罗斯可能在战场上使用核武器的情况，也许北约可以单方面宣布不首先对俄罗斯使用核武器。

北约有能力这样做，因为它的常规力量比俄罗斯强大得多，这样的承诺并不会削弱其核反击的能力。

以下为英文原文：

SCMP: China and the Philippines have been in a row for some time over disputed islands in the South China Sea. Do you see the situation continuing and what is China’s strategy?

Zhou Bo: China has never used force against the Philippines. Yes the Chinese coastguard used water cannon to dispel the Philippine coastguard, but I think that is deterrence, not a use of force. Historically, it is the Philippine coastguard that has used force to kill innocent Chinese fishermen from the mainland and Taiwan in 2000, 2006 and 2013. Few people seem to remember that, but you can google it to find out.

The Philippines ran a naval ship aground in May 1999 at Renai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal) on the pretext of“technical difficulties”. In the face of Chinese protests, it made promises to tow away the vessel. But it has not done that. Instead, the Philippines has attempted to build it into a permanent installation.

The Philippines claims that China has threatened to use force to drive away Philippine fishermen from the waters of Scarborough Shoal in spite of their long-standing fishing activities in those waters. But it was the Philippines that first resorted to the threat of force. In April 2012, they sent a naval vessel to detain and arrest Chinese fishing boats and fishermen in the waters of Scarborough Shoal.

China has been forced to take necessary measures in response to such provocative conduct. However, our response is restraint. For humanitarian reasons, we haven’t stopped the Philippines from providing water and food to their soldiers on board the grounded ship. Otherwise how could they have stayed there for the past 25 years?

SCMP: What would be the best and worst-case scenarios for China in this situation and is Beijing preparing for the worst? And is there a risk of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations forming a Nato-like alliance?

Zhou Bo: Well, the best-case scenario would be for the Philippines to tow the ship away as they have pledged. At least they shouldn’t try to reinforce the ship. The best way is to let Mother Nature solve the problem with her force majeure.

In the worst-case scenario, if they continue to be this provocative, we will definitely see more tension. It is the Philippines that violated its own promise in 1999. China’s demand is entirely reasonable and we have demonstrated immense patience over the past decades.

Will Asean form a Nato-like alliance? This is impossible. Asean itself is not a military alliance by nature. It has claimed its centrality and its centrality has to rely on impartiality. That China has disputes with the Philippines doesn’t mean it has issues with the entirety of Asean, regardless of the Philippines being a member.

The South China Sea issue cannot be interpreted as China having disputes with Asean. China only has disputes with a few Asean claimants. Actually, many of its member states have overlapping claims in disputed waters among themselves.

SCMP: What do you make of the role of the United States in the South China Sea tensions?

Zhou Bo: I don’t believe the US would necessarily come to the fore to confront China on behalf of any Asean claimants. They wouldn’t be so stupid. They already have enough trouble in Europe and the Middle East.

China has never threatened to use force against Asean countries. China has also honoured its commitments to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which discourages the use of force in the region.

I hope the Philippines would not be stupid to become more adventurous. They should know they don’t stand a chance vis-à-vis China. The strength of the Chinese side is way beyond that of the Philippines. Even if this situation may continue for a while, eventually the Philippine government will have to back down.

SCMP: Commenters in the West describe PLA activities in the South China Sea as“dangerous manoeuvres” or“reckless behaviour”. What role do you think a dominant narrative or understanding plays in modern geopolitics?

Zhou Bo: I think that portraying the PLA as coercive or reckless is a kind of deliberate Western narrative. But so far, the Western media has not described the PLA in a more negative way because they just can’t find examples.

China has been a miracle in terms of its development. Since 1979, China has not fought any war with any other country in spite of incidents like the collision of Chinese and US military aircraft in 2001 and a deadly brawl between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley border area in 2020.

Without a single war being fought over the past four decades, we reached the second position in the world. Isn’t that phenomenal? This is not just luck. We have endured and held back for our goals and for a bigger picture. I sincerely believe China’s rise is peaceful – and rare in human history.

SCMP: Western discussions of China inevitably come with criticisms of the PLA’s“provocative behaviour” and concerns about how the Chinese military has grown. What’s your take on external perceptions of the PLA?

Zhou Bo: The PLA certainly generates a lot of different reactions in different people – awe, fear or uncertainty. The PLA Navy is now the largest navy in the world. So it is natural for people to ask what an ever stronger PLA means for China and the world. But some argue that the PLA has not fought a war since 1979 and doubt whether the PLA can fight.

For all the militaries in the world, there is a common task: to defend territory and sovereignty. But since China is a major global power, its military has two more duties: to safeguard its overseas interests and shoulder its international responsibilities.

For example, the PLA has offered equal protection to Chinese and foreign vessels in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. This is a good example of how a strong PLA can best blend China’s national interests with its international responsibilities.

SCMP: China has set a goal to turn its vast military into a modern fighting force by 2027, the centenary of the PLA’s establishment. What does this goal specifically mean? What kind of force does the PLA want to become?

Zhou Bo: The PLA’s final goal is not a secret. We have declared that we want to become a world-class military by 2049. But the goal was actually modified at the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2022, which said we should“speed up” progress to advance the goal. This means we have to become a world-class military before 2049, though it didn’t say how many years in advance we should do it.

The 2027 goal is a different story, since it marks the 100th year since the PLA’s establishment, a landmark moment. We want to build up our military and be ready to advance to our 2049 goal.

At the same time, we are facing our biggest dilemma, that is, how to prove we are a world-class military without fighting and winning some difficult battles. China has reaped tremendous benefits from maintaining peace with other countries so it clearly cannot test whether the sword is sharp by chopping heads – that is the wrong thing to do.

While we haven’t been at war for 40 years and more, that does not mean that we cannot fight, otherwise the American military would not need to be so worried about the PLA.

SCMP: Why does China want to speed up the progress on building its military?

I think that has a lot to do with how you see the overall situation, meaning tensions in US-China ties or potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Taiwan should be the most important factor.

On the Taiwan issue, you can see Beijing’s attitude is different towards Taiwan’s former president Ma Ying-jeou and its current leader Tsai Ing-wen. Her successor, Lai Ching-te, may bring more uncertainty.

The US is intensifying competition with China and is providing support to Taiwan, despite saying it follows the one-China policy. Those are good reasons we should speed up achieving the PLA’s goal.

SCMP: Some US officials have said China aims to build up its military capacity to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027. Do you think the PLA timeline has anything to do with Beijing’s goal of unifying Taiwan?

Zhou Bo: If you study carefully what China has said, it is still about peaceful reunification. We mentioned at the Communist Party’s 20th national congress [in 2022] that we would have ultimate patience and make utmost efforts for a peaceful reunification. Right now, I think this very much remains the same.

SCMP: Do you think Taiwanese "president-elect" William Lai Ching-te may step across Beijing’s“red lines”? Beijing has already labelled him a troublemaker, as well as a“stubborn Taiwan independence activist”.

Zhou Bo: Honestly, I don’t know. I think there is some good reason for us to say he is a“stubborn Taiwan independence activist” because he once declared himself as a“pragmatic worker for Taiwan’s independence”. But the point is, when a man gets a new position, things may change. So we’ll have to wait and see what he’s going to do. I believe the US is also watching closely.

SCMP: After the then US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August 2022, the PLA carried out rounds of exercises and appeared to create a new norm of frequently flying across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. What is your take on the situation and how dangerous is this?

Zhou Bo: Historically speaking, we didn’t fly across the median line, at least not as often as we are doing now. Things changed after the Pelosi business. Her trip to Taiwan was totally unacceptable to us. This kind of provocation resets the status quo.

If she hadn’t visited Taiwan, it would have been hard for us to conduct the live-fire exercise around the island which lasted for four days. Such provocations will definitely lead to reactions which in turn, will create irreversible new status quos. You see now we fly much more often across the median line – that’s a response to their provocation. That is also a new status quo.

SCMP: According to many officials and think tanks in the US, the most likely military option against Taiwan is a blockade, which they regard as likely to fail. What do you think?

Zhou Bo: Military planners seldom rely on one option. I think we have different options. Our choices depend on what actually happens.

SCMP: Moving away from Taiwan, what are your thoughts on the Ukraine war?

Zhou Bo: No war will last forever, the question is how and when it will end. I don’t believe the Ukrainians will be able to take back their lost territories. They will be lucky if Russia does not advance beyond the regions already taken, because Ukraine’s counteroffensive – which is fully supported by the West – has failed since it was launched last year.

The military balance is not in favour of the Ukrainians and the whole of the West doesn’t have enough ammunition to offer in an endless and seamless way. I don’t believe Ukraine will have the upper hand, especially if Donald Trump comes back. He may just make a U-turn on the US’ Ukraine stance. That is the worst fear of European countries. We just don’t know when it will end since both sides don’t have the wish for a ceasefire now.

SCMP: So what are your thoughts on China’s position on the war in Ukraine?

Zhou Bo: This war matters a lot for China and even reflects China’s ever-rising international position as, all of a sudden, everyone asks which side are you on and what is your thinking.

This is interesting because the war has nothing to do with China. Why would people ask about China? Because China’s approach is too important to ignore.

The West believes China can simply tell Russia to end the war. But how can things be that simple? It is really sad to see how a war that has nothing to do with China has actually soured ties between China and the European Union.

But I am not pessimistic. I think that as long as the Ukraine war continues, the relationship can’t be too good, because the EU has high expectations of China that Beijing cannot meet. But as long as there is no war in the Taiwan Strait, China-EU ties won’t be too bad because they don’t have to make a hard decision between the United States and their largest trading partner.

SCMP: What’s your take on the war in Gaza?

Zhou Bo: No one knows when the Ukraine war will come to an end. But in the Middle East, even if a war comes to an end, nobody knows when it will crop up again.

The war in the Gaza Strip has brought too many casualties, to the extent that it has been described as genocide. US support for Israel has delivered a heavy blow to its moral authority and really hurts its image and credibility, especially in the Global South. The impact will be long lasting.

SCMP: How do you regard Russia’s resilience? Could it hold on, despite the massive costs of the war?

Zhou Bo: Russia’s economy actually is doing quite well, with economic growth of 3.6 per cent last year. This has surprised everybody – probably even the Russians themselves – while Ukraine’s economy is in bad shape.

On lessons learned, apparently Russia is making progress on the battlefield. But in the beginning, they didn’t seem so prepared – no forward command, no adequate logistics supply, no drones, no encrypted communication and no precision-guided bombs. But that has changed.

Another lesson is that the pattern of war has changed a lot and the PLA must keep pace with advanced technologies, including drones and maybe artificial intelligence one day, while maintaining traditional things like tanks and artillery.

In the past, we might have considered drones to be supplementary, but it has proven to be a new combat platform that could bring massive changes to the battlefield. We saw this in both Ukraine and the Red Sea.

Meanwhile, we cannot totally rely on new technologies because you see that tanks and artillery are still being used and people are still digging trenches in the Ukraine war – like during the first world war.

SCMP: Speaking of advanced technology, how is China applying AI in the military and could China cooperate with the US in this area?

Zhou Bo: On the first question, we have state of the art drones of all sorts. I don’t think we have yet seen the application of AI directly in military warfare. I think even the US hasn’t demonstrated that.

President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden agreed in San Francisco last year to set up China-US government talks on AI, but it was not specified whether the dialogue would involve the militaries.

But I assume it is not entirely impossible in the long term because both countries understand the importance of ensuring human control of weapons systems. Advanced AI has made this issue more acute.

SCMP: Would there be some areas that the US and China could prioritise to prevent some dangerous applications of AI, such as in nuclear weapons?

Zhou Bo: I think it would be difficult in the near future for China and the US to talk about that because these are highly sensitive areas. So far, there are no official consultations or negotiations in the nuclear field between China and the US. For this to happen, either China needs to drastically increase its nuclear arsenal or the US massively reduces its nuclear arsenal. Neither is possible.

But I think both China and the US need to make an effort to make sure that this kind of advanced AI would not be applied in the most crucial military areas, including nuclear weapons. Nothing is more important than making sure of absolute human control of the nuclear command and control system.

SCMP: Last year, China and the US resumed military dialogue. Now that they are talking again, what should we expect？

Zhou Bo: The resumption of dialogue is inevitable. But something new is that there is now a communication channel between the heads of theatre commands.

This is a new mechanism that has to be thoroughly explored by the two sides. For example, is the conversation just between commanders of the PLA Southern Theatre Command and US Indo-Pacific Command, or could it also involve the PLA Northern Theatre Command and Eastern Theatre Command?

This is because American reconnaissance and surveillance along the Chinese coast cover areas of all these three Chinese military commands. Would the commanders talk regularly or just during a crisis? I assume they basically talk about dangerous encounters between ships and aircraft. But what about a dangerous situation that involves a third party? Questions like this could go on and on.

SCMP: What is the risk of an encounter between the Chinese and US ships and aircraft?

Zhou Bo: There have already been a number of dangerous close encounters between US and Chinese aircraft. According to the Pentagon, in the two years from the autumn of 2021, the PLA intercepted more than 180 American aircraft. We have to make those interceptions because you can’t just come so close to us to make provocations.

I do not see an easy solution to this because it is difficult for the US to back down. They have been doing this for a long time and if they stop, they would worry about their image in the eyes of their allies. But I don’t understand why the US has to scrutinise China at such a high frequency. Don’t they have a lot of drones and military satellites that provide real-time intelligence?

SCMP: Is the risk of US and China military encounters overestimated? How dangerous are they, and is there a way out of the situation?

Zhou Bo: They’re certainly very dangerous, when aircraft and ships get so close. Chinese and Americans have different takes on safety and security, which are the same word in Chinese. Americans talk about safety. We talk about security.

Safety refers to keeping your property, like your ships, and personnel safe but security connotes more meaning. It’s about sovereignty, rights and interests. International maritime law doesn’t necessarily help.

In 2013, I headed a Chinese delegation to the Pentagon to discuss the legal implications of freedom of navigation. Each side had different interpretations of international maritime law. So there are no easy solutions to mitigate the risk of encounters.

SCMP: How many aircraft carriers does China need and why is it important for China to have them?

Zhou Bo: I cannot speculate on how many carriers China will need. But I can tell you that aircraft carriers are primarily not for coastal fights. They are for a possible war far from home.

People may say that one day, when China has to retreat from peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue, we could use aircraft carriers. Of course they are useful, but they are more useful in our power projection in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, or Atlantic Ocean – anywhere far from our waters.

SCMP: The US has said China will have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. What do you think are some of the Chinese leadership’s considerations behind the advancement of its nuclear capabilities?

Zhou Bo: Nobody in China will tell you how many nuclear warheads we have because that is considered a secret. Having said that, it is not a secret that we want to have a nuclear arsenal that is effective and modernised.

Everybody worries about the use of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war. Then why don’t we discuss no first use of nuclear weapons? The Biden administration has talked about the use of nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances, which means it is actually not so far away from China’s no-first-use policy.

China’s no-first-use policy has remained the same for decades. I think we should discuss no first use of nuclear weapons between China and the US, France and Britain. China and Russia have agreed on no first use. As a goodwill gesture and to mitigate the worst fear of the West that Russia might use nuclear weapons in the battlefield, perhaps Nato can unilaterally announce not to use nuclear weapons against Russia first.

Nato can afford to do this because its conventional forces are much stronger than Russia’s and such a commitment won’t reduce its nuclear retaliation capacity.