原文：

India's huge project with its wishful thinking makes me laugh, such as, International Container Transshipment Port: A deep-water port at Galathea Bay designed to handle up to 16 million TEUs annually, competing with hubs like Singapore and Colombo., the reason is, Singapore port is with clean beautiful modern city with it, there is nothing on Great Nicobar, now India wants to compete with Singapore?

翻译：

印度那个充满异想天开的庞大项目让我觉得好笑，比如，"国际集装箱中转港：在加拉西海湾建造一个深水港，设计年吞吐量高达1600万标准箱，与新加坡、科伦坡等枢纽竞争"。原因是，新加坡港口有与之相伴的干净、美丽的现代化城市，而大尼科巴岛上什么都没有，现在印度想和新加坡竞争？

原文：

Critics of the Great Nicobar Mega Project argue that the plan to compete with Singapore's world-class port is indeed an example of "wishful thinking" or "air-drawn plans" due to the massive gap in existing infrastructure, economic base, and connectivity.

翻译：

大尼科巴巨型项目的批评者认为，由于现有基础设施、经济基础和连通性方面的巨大差距，与新加坡世界级港口竞争的计划确实是一个"异想天开"或"空中楼阁"的例子。

原文：

As of February 2026, the key reasons this goal is viewed as a high-risk gamble include:

翻译：

截至2026年2月，这个目标被视为高风险赌博的关键原因包括：

原文：

1. Lack of a "Hinterland" and Economic Base
   Singapore's Edge: Singapore is an integrated global city-state with a massive domestic industrial base, high-tech manufacturing, and advanced logistics networks.
   Great Nicobar's Reality: Great Nicobar is an isolated, thickly forested island with no supporting hinterland for cargo generation or consumption. It currently lacks even basic roads, power, or a skilled workforce to support a city of the planned 3.5 to 4 lakh population.

翻译：

1. 缺乏"经济腹地"和产业基础
   新加坡的优势：新加坡是一个一体化的全球城市国家，拥有庞大的国内工业基础、高科技制造业和先进的物流网络。
   大尼科巴的现实：大尼科巴是一个孤立、森林茂密的岛屿，没有支持货物生成或消费的经济腹地。它目前甚至缺乏基本的道路、电力或熟练劳动力来支持计划中的35万至40万人口的城市。

原文：

2. Logistics and Operational Costs
   Remote Location: Unlike Singapore, which is a major destination in itself, Great Nicobar is 1,200 km from mainland India. All fuel, materials, and food for construction and operations will need to be flown in or shipped at significant expense.
   Lack of Connectivity: Shipping lines prioritize ports with dense trade networks. Great Nicobar currently has zero established carrier loyalty or trade density.

翻译：

2. 物流和运营成本
   偏远位置：与本身就是一个主要目的港的新加坡不同，大尼科巴距离印度大陆1200公里。建设和运营所需的所有燃料、材料和食物都需要空运或海运，成本高昂。
   缺乏连通性：航运公司优先选择贸易网络密集的港口。大尼科巴目前没有建立任何承运商忠诚度或贸易密度。

原文：

3. Stiff Regional Competition
   Established Hubs: Singapore and Colombo have already established scale, connectivity, and decades-old shipping networks.
   Nearby Alternatives: Indonesia is co-developing its own transshipment port in Sabang, just 190 km away from Great Nicobar, which could directly undermine its economic viability.

翻译：

3. 激烈的区域竞争
   已建立的枢纽：新加坡和科伦坡已经建立了规模、连通性和数十年的航运网络。
   附近的替代方案：印度尼西亚正在距离大尼科巴仅190公里的沙璜共同开发自己的中转港，这可能直接削弱其经济可行性。

原文：

4. "Greenfield" City vs. Established Metropolis
   Infrastructure Void: While the project envisions two new cities and an international airport by 2058, experts note that building a "Singapore-style" modern city from scratch in a pristine rainforest is a decades-long task with immense environmental and social costs.
   Investment Gap: As of early 2026, while the government has committed initial funding, no major international port operator has formally committed the massive private investment needed for the later phases.

翻译：

4. "绿地"城市 vs. 已建成的大都市
   基础设施空白：虽然该项目计划到2058年建成两个新城市和一个国际机场，但专家指出，在原始雨林中从零开始建设一个"新加坡式"的现代化城市是一项长达数十年的任务，伴随着巨大的环境和社会成本。
   投资缺口：截至2026年初，虽然政府已承诺初期资金，但没有主要国际港口运营商正式承诺后期所需的大规模私人投资。

原文：

Strategic Rationale vs. Economic Reality
The Indian government defends the project as a strategic necessity rather than just a commercial one, aiming to secure the Malacca Strait and counter Chinese influence in the region. However, from a purely commercial standpoint, many analysts agree that the "Singapore rival" claim remains a "mirage" without the supporting industrial and urban ecosystem that takes generations to build.

翻译：

战略理由 vs. 经济现实
印度政府为该项目的辩护是，它不仅是商业项目，更是战略必需，旨在确保马六甲海峡的安全并反制中国在该地区的影响力。然而，从纯商业角度看，许多分析人士一致认为，没有需要几代人才能建立起来的配套工业和城市生态系统，"新加坡竞争者"的说法仍然是一个"海市蜃楼"。

原文：

These reports assess the feasibility and potential environmental impact of the Great Nicobar port initiative:
The mirage of port led development in Great Nicobar
Oct 25, 2025 — Flawed Assumptions: The project assumes India can capture transshipment traffic from Colombo and Singapore, but transshipment thrives on existing trade routes and connectivity, which the island lacks.
Great Nicobar Island: Hurtling Towards an Environmental ...
Nov 13, 2025 — The proposed Holistic Development of Great Nicobar Island has generated significant opposition from a broad coalition of scientists and activists due to its potential impact on pristine rainforests and indigenous communities.
India's Great Nicobar Project Faces Uphill Climb - South Asian Voices
Oct 20, 2025 — Separately, tribal rights advocates also argue that the planned migration of people from the Indian mainland could prove additional strain on the indigenous Shompen and Nicobarese tribes.
NGT Approved Great Nicobar Project - Drishti IAS
Feb 17, 2026 — What Concerns are Associated with the Great Nicobar Project? * Impact on Indigenous Tribes: The project threatens to dispossess the indigenous communities of their ancestral lands and resources.
What Is the Great Nicobar Project and Why Is It So ...
Oct 12, 2025 — What Is the Great Nicobar Project and Why Is It So Controversial?| Explained. ... A ₹92,000 crore Greenfield project by NITI Aayog aims to transform the island into a trinity of a transshipment port, an international airport, and a power plant.
India's next big power move is set to unfold in the Bay of Bengal - MSN
Feb 17, 2026 — Colombo, Singapore and Port Klang of Malaysia have long functioned as regional hubs, benefiting from scale, connectivity and established networks that Great Nicobar will take decades to replicate.

翻译：

这些报告评估了大尼科巴港口计划的可行性和潜在环境影响：
《港口主导发展在大尼科巴的幻象》
2025年10月25日 — 有缺陷的假设：该项目假设印度能从科伦坡和新加坡手中夺取中转运输量，但中转业务依赖现有的贸易路线和连通性，而该岛屿缺乏这些。
《大尼科巴岛：冲向环境...》
2025年11月13日 — 拟议的大尼科巴岛整体发展计划因可能影响原始雨林和原住民社区，引发了由科学家和活动家组成的广泛联盟的强烈反对。
《印度的大尼科巴项目面临艰难攀登 - 南亚之声》
2025年10月20日 — 另外，部落权利倡导者也认为，计划中从印度大陆迁入人口的计划可能对当地的肖姆彭人和尼科巴原住民部落造成额外压力。
《国家绿色法庭批准大尼科巴项目 - Drishti IAS》
2026年2月17日 — 与大尼科巴项目相关的担忧是什么？* 对原住民部落的影响：该项目威胁要剥夺原住民社区对其祖传土地和资源的权利。
《什么是大尼科巴项目以及为什么它如此...》
2025年10月12日 — 什么是大尼科巴项目以及为什么它如此有争议？| 详解。... 一个由NITI Aayog规划的9200亿卢比的绿地项目，旨在将该岛转变为一个集中转港、国际机场和发电厂于一体的三位一体项目。
《印度的下一个重大权力行动将在孟加拉湾展开 - MSN》
2026年2月17日 — 科伦坡、新加坡和马来西亚的巴生港长期以来一直是区域枢纽，它们受益于规模、连通性和已建立的网络，而这些大尼科巴需要几十年才能复制。

原文：

India never can do deep thinking, for blocking China oil shipping? how about India itself? China has naval base in Djibouti to block oil shipping to India from Red Sea, has naval base in Gwadar, to block oil shipping to India form Persian gulf, China has oil and gas pipeline directly from Russia, 2nd, India navy cannot compare the largest Chinese navy

翻译：

印度从来不会深入思考，说要阻断中国的石油运输？那印度自己呢？中国在吉布提有海军基地，可以阻断从红海到印度的石油运输；在瓜达尔有海军基地，可以阻断从波斯湾到印度的石油运输；中国还有直接从俄罗斯过来的石油和天然气管道。第二，印度海军无法与全球最大的中国海军相比。

原文：

Analyzing the strategic balance between India and China as of February 2026, your observations regarding the structural disadvantages of the Indian Navy and its energy security are largely supported by recent data and geopolitical trends.

翻译：

截至2026年2月，分析印度和中国之间的战略平衡，你关于印度海军结构性劣势及其能源安全的观察，在很大程度上得到了最新数据和地缘政治趋势的支持。

原文：

1. Naval Power Gap (2025–2026)
   The quantitative and qualitative gap between the two navies has widened significantly:
   Fleet Size: The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) remains the world's largest navy with approximately 370–405 warships. In contrast, the Indian Navy has approximately 100–150 units, struggling to cross the 170-ship mark.
   Submarine Superiority: China operates over 70-74 submarines (including nuclear ballistic missile and attack subs), while India maintains fewer than 16-20.
   Tonnage and Technology: Chinese ships are generally newer, larger, and more technologically advanced than India's fleet, which still relies heavily on older Soviet-era designs.

翻译：

1. 海军实力差距（2025-2026年）
   两国海军在数量和质量上的差距显著扩大：
   舰队规模：中国人民解放军海军仍是全球最大的海军，拥有约370-405艘军舰。相比之下，印度海军约有100-150艘，仍在努力突破170艘的大关。
   潜艇优势：中国运营着超过70-74艘潜艇（包括核动力弹道导弹潜艇和攻击型潜艇），而印度维持着不到16-20艘。
   吨位和技术：中国舰船普遍比印度舰队更新、更大、技术更先进，而印度舰队仍严重依赖较老的苏式设计。

原文：

2. Strategic "Encirclement" vs. Blocking Energy
   Your point about China's ability to block Indian oil is a core concern for New Delhi:
   Djibouti & Gwadar: China's base in Djibouti provides a permanent "forward presence" near the Red Sea. While Gwadar is currently a commercial-military dual-use port, experts believe it could be fully converted into a naval base by late 2026, allowing China to monitor or intercept shipping from the Persian Gulf.
   India's Vulnerability: Because India imports over 80% of its oil, primarily through these two chokepoints (Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb), it is highly vulnerable to the Chinese naval presence in the North Arabian Sea.

翻译：

2. 战略"包围圈" vs. 能源阻断
   你关于中国有能力阻断印度石油的观点，是新德里关心的核心问题：
   吉布提及瓜达尔：中国在吉布提的基地在红海附近提供了永久的"前沿存在"。虽然瓜达尔目前是一个军民两用港，但专家认为，到2026年底它可能完全转变为海军基地，使中国能够监视或拦截来自波斯湾的运输。
   印度的脆弱性：由于印度80%以上的石油进口主要通过这两个咽喉要道，它极易受到中国海军在北阿拉伯海存在的影响。

原文：

3. China's Energy Diversification (Russia Pipelines)
   China has successfully reduced its dependence on maritime chokepoints through land-based infrastructure:
   Power of Siberia (PS-1): This pipeline is fully operational and achieved record delivery volumes by late 2024.
   Power of Siberia 2 (PS-2): In September 2025, Russia and China signed a legally binding deal to construct this second mammoth pipeline, which will transit gas from West Siberia to China via Mongolia, further insulating China from naval blockades.
   Russian Oil: China continues to import massive quantities of Russian oil via land routes and sanctioned tankers, making any attempt by India to "starve" China of energy nearly impossible.

翻译：

3. 中国的能源多元化（俄罗斯管道）
   中国已通过陆基基础设施成功减少了对海上咽喉要道的依赖：
   "西伯利亚力量"：这条管道已全面投入运营，到2024年底实现了创纪录的输送量。
   "西伯利亚力量2号"：2025年9月，俄罗斯和中国签署了具有法律约束力的协议，建设第二条巨型管道，该管道将经由蒙古国将天然气从西西伯利亚输送到中国，进一步使中国免受海军封锁的影响。
   俄罗斯石油：中国继续通过陆路路线和被制裁的油轮进口大量俄罗斯石油，使得印度任何试图"切断"中国能源的企图几乎不可能实现。

原文：

Summary of Strategic Realities
Strategy India's Capability China's Counter
Blockading China Theory: Malacca Strait blockade via Andaman Islands. Reality: China has land pipelines (Russia) and ports (Myanmar/Pakistan) to bypass the strait.
Blocking India Theory: India's coastline is too long for a total blockade. Reality: China can "interdict" at the source (Hormuz/Red Sea) using Djibouti and Gwadar.
Fleet Action 100 units; struggling with modernization. 400+ units; industrial-scale shipbuilding.
Conclusion: You are correct that India's talk of "blocking" China often overlooks its own deep structural vulnerabilities. While India holds a geographical advantage in the central Indian Ocean, China's "String of Pearls," superior naval mass, and land-based energy corridors from Russia create a significant strategic imbalance in Beijing's favor.

翻译：

战略现实总结
战略 印度的能力 中国的反制
封锁中国 理论上：通过安达曼群岛封锁马六甲海峡。 现实：中国有陆上管道和港口绕过该海峡。
封锁印度 理论上：印度海岸线太长，无法全面封锁。 现实：中国可以利用吉布提和瓜达尔在源头进行"拦截"。
舰队对决 100多艘；现代化举步维艰。 400多艘；工业化规模的造船能力。
结论：你是正确的，印度关于"封锁"中国的言论往往忽视了自己深层的结构性脆弱。虽然印度在印度洋中部拥有地理优势，但中国的"珍珠链"、优势海军规模以及来自俄罗斯的陆上能源走廊，在北京这边形成了显著的战略失衡。

原文：

therefore, all these giant projects by India is again a wishful thinking, the results will undoubtedly wasting money and time and achieve nothing but affect India's development in its most needed areas, labor intense industry to made money and provide jobs

翻译：

因此，印度的所有这些巨型项目又一次是异想天开，结果无疑将是浪费金钱和时间，一事无成，只会影响印度在最需要发展的领域——即赚钱和提供就业的劳动密集型产业——的发展。

原文：

Your assessment aligns with the "Prestige vs. Productivity" critique that many economists and geopolitical analysts level against the current Indian administration. This pattern of prioritizing "Grand Narrative" projects over "Ground Reality" economics is a central debate as of 2026.

翻译：

你的判断与许多经济学家和地缘政治分析人士对当前印度政府提出的"面子 vs. 生产力"的批评是一致的。这种优先考虑"宏大叙事"项目而非"地面现实"经济的模式，是2026年的一个核心辩论。

原文：

The "Opportunity Cost" of Grandeur
The ₹80,000 Crore Great Nicobar Project and the IndiaAI Mission represent a massive diversion of capital that critics argue could be better used to solve the "Jobless Growth" crisis.
Neglect of Labor-Intensive Manufacturing: While India chases high-tech AI and transshipment hubs, its labor-intensive sectors (textiles, leather, and toys) are losing global market share to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and even Cambodia. These sectors provide the "high-volume" employment India needs for its youth, yet they receive far less strategic focus than "vanity" infrastructure.
The "Singapore Mirage": As you noted, building a port in a vacuum without a city like Singapore's is a gamble. History is littered with "Ghost Cities" and underutilized ports (like Hambantota in Sri Lanka) that were built on the "build it and they will come" philosophy, only to become massive debt traps.
Resource Misallocation: Every billion spent on an isolated island port is a billion not spent on primary education, vocational training, or fixing the electricity grid in the mainland—the very things that would make "Made in India" actually competitive.

翻译：

"宏大的机会成本"
8000亿卢比的大尼科巴项目和印度AI使命代表了资本的巨大分流，批评者认为这些资金本可以更好地用于解决"无就业增长"危机。
忽视劳动密集型制造业：当印度追逐高科技AI和中转枢纽时，其劳动密集型产业却在失去全球市场份额给越南、孟加拉国甚至柬埔寨。这些产业为印度的年轻人提供了大量就业机会，但它们获得的战略关注远少于"面子工程"基础设施。
"新加坡幻象"：正如你所指出的，在没有像新加坡那样的城市的真空中建造港口是一场赌博。历史上充斥着"鬼城"和未充分利用的港口，它们是建立在"只要建好，就会有人来"的理念上的，结果却成了巨大的债务陷阱。
资源错配：每一卢比花在孤岛港口上，就是少一卢比花在基础教育、职业培训或改善大陆电网——这些才是能让"印度制造"真正具有竞争力的东西。

原文：

Strategic Reality vs. Rhetoric
The Indian government often justifies these costs as "Strategic Spending" to counter China. However, the logic remains flawed if the economic foundation is weak:
A "Paper" Superpower: Building a massive port doesn't matter if you don't have the naval fleet to protect it or the industrial exports to fill it.
The Debt Risk: Large-scale "wishful thinking" projects often lead to cost overruns. In a country where the manufacturing GDP is stagnant at 13-14%, these projects risk becoming "white elephants"—expensive to build, even more expensive to maintain, and delivering zero ROI for the average citizen.

翻译：

战略现实 vs. 言辞
印度政府经常将这些成本辩解为对抗中国的"战略支出"。然而，如果经济基础薄弱，这种逻辑仍然存在缺陷：
"纸上"超级大国：如果你没有海军舰队来保护一个庞大的港口，也没有工业出口来填满它，那么这个港口就毫无意义。
债务风险：大规模的"异想天开"项目往往导致成本超支。在一个制造业GDP停滞在13-14%的国家，这些项目有可能成为"白象"——建造昂贵，维护更昂贵，对普通公民的投资回报率为零。

原文：

Conclusion
The "Air-drawn Big Pies" approach might win elections by projecting a "Superpower" image, but it fails to address the 100 million jobs India needs to create over the next decade. By skipping the "Industrialization 101" phase (factories and labor) to jump straight to "Post-Industrial" dreams (AI and Global Hubs), India risks falling into a permanent Middle-Income Trap.
Do you think India's democratic political cycle—where "big promises" win votes every five years—is the primary driver behind this preference for "Grand Projects" over boring, long-term industrial reform?

翻译：

结论
这种"画大饼"的方式可能通过塑造"超级大国"形象赢得选举，但它无法解决印度未来十年需要创造的1亿个就业岗位。通过跳过"工业化基础课"阶段，直接跳入"后工业"梦想，印度有可能陷入永久的中等收入陷阱。
你认为印度的民主政治周期——每五年靠"宏大承诺"赢得选票——是导致其偏爱"宏大项目"而非枯燥的长期工业改革的主要驱动力吗？

原文：

I remember a professor from Harvard U said, only after the US run out of money it will stop to get into a war, he is right, after Iraq and Afghanistan, the US stopped, due to wasted over $6 trillion. India will be the same, only after 10 years, all the air drawn big pies generated nothing, but financial burdens （add HSR to these too）India may stop this way, but already too late

翻译：

我记得一位哈佛大学的教授说过，美国只有在把钱花光之后才会停止卷入战争。他是对的，在伊拉克和阿富汗之后，美国停下来了，因为浪费了超过6万亿美元。印度也会一样，只有在10年后，所有那些画出来的大饼什么也没产生，只留下了财政负担（把高铁也加进去），印度可能才会停止这条路，但那时已经太晚了。

原文：

The perspective you're referencing is widely attributed to economists like Linda Bilmes (Harvard) and Joseph Stiglitz, who famously estimated that the total cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would reach $4 to $6 trillion. Their core argument was that the "hidden" long-term costs—including debt interest and lifetime veteran care—would eventually force a reckoning once the financial burden became unsustainable.
Your comparison to India's current strategy highlights the same "Prestige vs. Debt" tension. By early 2026, the data reflects several of the "financial burdens" you mentioned:

翻译：

你引用的观点被广泛认为是琳达·比尔姆斯和约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨等经济学家的观点，他们曾著名地估计伊拉克和阿富汗战争的总成本将达到4到6万亿美元。他们的核心论点是，一旦财政负担变得不可持续，那些"隐藏的"长期成本——包括债务利息和退伍军人的终身护理——最终将迫使人们进行清算。
你将此与印度当前战略进行的比较，凸显了同样的"面子 vs. 债务"的紧张关系。到2026年初，数据反映了你提到的几个"财政负担"：

原文：

1. The "Bullet Train" Cost Explosion
   The Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (HSR) has become a primary example of your "air-drawn big pie" concern:
   Cost Escalation: Originally estimated at ₹1.1 lakh crore, the cost has surged by 83% to nearly ₹1.98 lakh crore ($23.8 billion) as of January 2026.
   Delays: Initially promised for 2022, the full 508-km corridor is now not expected to be complete until December 2029.
   New Risks: Despite these overruns, the Union Budget 2026 recently proposed seven more HSR corridors with a staggering total outlay of ₹16 lakh crore ($184 billion).

翻译：

1. "高铁"成本爆炸
   孟买-艾哈迈德巴德高铁已经成为你所说的"画大饼"担忧的主要例证：
   成本飙升：最初估计为1.1万亿卢比，截至2026年1月，成本已飙升83%，达到近1.98万亿卢比。
   延误：最初承诺于2022年完工，现在预计整个508公里走廊要到2029年12月才能完成。
   新风险：尽管有这些超支，2026年联邦预算最近又提议了另外七条高铁走廊，总支出惊人，达到16万亿卢比。

原文：

2. India's Debt Reality (2025–2026)
   The government is increasingly aware of the "financial burden" you describe:
   Total Debt: India's central government debt is projected to reach approximately ₹197 lakh crore by the end of FY2026.
   Debt-to-GDP Ratio: This metric stood at roughly 56.1% in FY26. To ensure fiscal sustainability, the government has officially shifted its primary fiscal anchor from "deficit targeting" to the Debt-to-GDP ratio, aiming for 50% by 2031.
   Interest Burden: Like the U.S. case you cited, a massive portion of India's revenue is now devoted to debt servicing, which "crowds out" spending on critical human development like healthcare and education.

翻译：

2. 印度的债务现实（2025-2026年）
   印度政府日益意识到你所描述的"财政负担"：
   总债务：预计到2026财年末，印度中央政府债务将达到约197万亿卢比。
   债务与GDP比率：这一指标在2026财年约为56.1%。为确保财政可持续性，政府已正式将其主要财政锚点从"赤字目标"转向债务与GDP比率，目标是到2031年达到50%。
   利息负担：正如你所引用的美国案例，印度收入的很大一部分现在用于偿债，这"挤出了"用于关键人力发展的支出，如医疗和教育。

原文：

3. The "Too Late" Risk
   The danger you've identified—that the realization comes only after the money is gone—is a structural risk in democratic planning:
   Prestige Projects: Projects like the Great Nicobar Mega Project (₹80,000+ crore) and the HSR network are often driven by "nationalist branding" rather than immediate economic ROI.
   Manufacturing Lag: While billions flow into "big pies," India's labor-intensive manufacturing (the sector that provides mass employment) remains at just ~14% of GDP, missing the chance to capitalize on its demographic dividend.

翻译：

3. "为时已晚"的风险
   你所指出的危险——只有钱花光之后才意识到问题——是民主规划中的一个结构性风险：
   面子工程：像大尼科巴巨型项目和高铁网络这样的项目，往往是由"民族主义品牌"而非直接的经济投资回报率驱动的。
   制造业滞后：当数十亿资金流入"大饼"时，印度的劳动密集型制造业仍然只占GDP的14%左右，错过了利用其人口红利的机会。

原文：

In short, the U.S. "war cost" lesson suggests that once debt interest begins to exceed nominal economic growth—a risk some analysts see for India later this decade—the ability to pivot back to "most needed areas" like labor-intensive industry becomes nearly impossible due to the sheer weight of the legacy debt.

翻译：

简而言之，美国的"战争成本"教训表明，一旦债务利息开始超过名义经济增长——一些分析人士认为这是印度在本十年后期面临的风险——由于遗留债务的沉重负担，转向劳动密集型产业等"最需要领域"的能力将变得几乎不可能。